Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin, 2005.
More books have been written about the events surrounding the Second World War than almost any other period of history. Thousands of biographical and narrative works have been published, encompassing nearly every aspect of the conflict. In this veritable morass of titles, solid works have difficulty standing out from the rest. Though not a work of original research, John Keegan’s The Second World War manages to provide a factually solid synthesis of World War II that is a step above many similar publications, with but two minor flaws. Recognized as a premier military historian and author of over 20 books in his field and widely read in both Europe and the United States,[1] Keegan delivers a 600-page volume that offers an overview of the war from its Great War roots to its legacy as the most destructive war in history.
Keegan holds that the Second World War cannot be explained but by the First World War.[2] Since the study of historical causation often displays that history can easily become “the projection of ideology into the past,” he argues that it is therefore more profitable to examine howthe war was made possible, rather than attempting to determine whyit took place.[3] Keegan presents numerous material elements that dug the pit into which the twentieth-century world fell, in accordance with the idea that the cause of any given historical event cannot be reduced to a single factor. High birth rates, higher agricultural output, and improved hygienic capabilities combined to produce a nineteenth-century population surge in the European combatant nations which was matched by growth in industry, particularly in transportation.[4] The introduction of conscription took advantage of this boom and ensured that modern armies would reach unprecedented numbers in manpower, while improved organization of the state increased its operational effectiveness.[5] The great irony, Keegan writes, is that in the Great War the “young men which formed the fruit of nineteenth-century Europe’s economic miracle [were] consumed by the forces that gave them life and health.”[6] Quantum leaps in weaponry negated every advancement of the previous half-century.[7] The result was that 10 million men perished in the first worldwide conflagration,[8] followed by another 50 million in what was almost a continuation of itself.[9]
Keegan’s strength lies in his ability to effectively and concisely communicate an analysis of troop movements when relating a battle, without losing sight of the big picture of the given campaign. He includes multiple maps as a visual aid and the book is decorated with a choice selection of wartime photographs. Though widely-read enthusiasts will find little new in the way of details concerning the battles and general progression of the war, the benefits of this book are found in Keegan’s insight into the causation and irony of the Second World War as it relates to the first.
WhileThe Second World War examines every theater of the conflict, Keegan focuses primarily on the British, Russian, and German perspectives of the European war. His analysis of this area of operations is thorough, if at times brief. He touches on many familiar themes, such as the profound importance of Britain’s survival in 1940-41,[10] Hitler’s gravely mistaken choice to contest the economic capacity of the United States,[11] and the terrible acceleration of civilian bombing from navigational mishaps to thousand-bomber raids on scarcely justifiable targets.[12] Keegan also pierces several misconceptions, including that the firestorms suffered at historic cities such as Dresden relied on factors other than the sheer amount of Allied incendiary ordinance, like drought and weather conditions.[13] He also claims that Hitler did not ignore historical precedent when planning his campaigns against Russia, but instead studied Napoleon’s earlier attempt at conquest in an effort to gain an advantage.[14]
One drawback to this volume is the brevity with which Keegan handles the Pacific theater, devoting less than one quarter of the 600 pages to that area of the conflict. This is perhaps due to the author hailing from the United Kingdom, which would naturally influence his emphasis of perspective. Keegan lends his strategic analysis to the battles of Guadalcanal, Midway, and Leyte Gulf, but does not give time to more detailed exploration of facets like the isolationist stance of interwar America or the work on the Manhattan Project. These subjects are worth more time and exposition.
Keegan also leaves this work comparatively devoid of personal accounts by soldiers, sailors, and airmen, relying on his own descriptions to engage the reader. While these commentaries explain the material, they fail to grip the reader to the same degree as do words of the combatants. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of a famous passage by a German soldier at Stalingrad, more chilling than any description a noncombatant can ever provide:
Stalingrad is no longer a town. By day it is an enormous cloud of burning, blinding smoke; it is a vast furnace lit by reflection of the flames. And when night arrives, one of those scorching, howling nights, the dogs plunge into the Volga and swim desperately to gain the other bank. The nights of Stalingrad are a terror to them. Animals flee this hell; the hardest storms cannot bear it for long; only men endure.[15]
Including more eyewitness descriptions such as this would add an element of engaging authenticity and genuineness.
By authoring The Second World War, Keegan has made a solid addition to the many syntheses of World War II, albeit one in which the balance is tipped in favor of the European centers of action. While his explanations of troop movements are excellent and maintain focus on the overarching strategy of the war, his lack of eyewitness accounts and descriptions leaves something to be desired. The book is devoid of historical revisionism, and offers excellent insight into the superimposition of influences leading to the opening phases of the conflict. In a final piece of insight, Keegan adds that though no one of the time posited World War II as the ‘war to end all wars,’ as they did the Great War, “that may have been its abiding effect.”[16]
ENDNOTES
[1] Institute for Historical Review, The Second World War (Review). Accessed February 19, 2017. http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v10/v10p360_Ward.html.
[2] John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 2005), 10.
[3] Ibid., 11.
[4] Ibid., 12-14.
[5] Ibid., 14.
[6] Ibid., 24.
[7] Ibid., 17.
[8] Ibid., 24.
[9] Ibid., 590.
[10] Ibid., 95.
[11] Ibid., 219.
[12] Ibid., 419.
[13] Ibid., 426.
[14] Ibid., 136.
[15] Ibid., 231.
[16] Ibid., 595.
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